

# THE DEPROLETARIZATION OF CUBAN JEWRY\*

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## **Introduction**

Immigration of Eastern European Jews to the Western Hemisphere was often accompanied by a process of proletarianization. Jewish immigrants were employed as unskilled laborers – especially in the garment industry – and shared a strong class affiliation. They were active in the labor movement, and participated in the formation of trade unions. In a relatively short period, however, these Jews began to move from the labor class into the service sectors, especially commerce, and many of them preferred to become self-employed.<sup>1</sup>

This trend is evident in the history of Cuban Jewry: Among the Eastern Europeans – the largest group of Jews – the proletariat was dominant during the 1920s. The 1930s witnessed the growth of an urban proletariat among the native Cubans and the consolidation of the Cuban Labor Movement, while the Jewish minority was moving out of the working class.

This paper will attempt to analyze the main causes for the rapid deproletarianization of Cuban Jewry, distinguishing between those rooted in “Jewish” characteristics and those stemming from peculiarities of the Cuban economy and Cuban political attitudes towards foreign labor.<sup>2</sup>

## **A. Jewish Immigration to Cuba: Occupational Distribution and Proletarianization**

The flow of Jewish immigrants to Cuba contrasts with that of other immigrant groups. The latter were attracted to Cuba during the years of sugar prosperity that culminated immediately after World War I. Although most of the immigrants to Cuba between 1902 and 1919 came from Spain and the West Indies, there were also immigrants from the United States, Europe and Turkey – including some Jews.<sup>3</sup>

Jewish immigration to Cuba began as a consequence of the restrictions imposed on immigration to the United States, which coincided with the beginning of a series of economic crises in Cuba caused by the fall of sugar prices in the world market.<sup>4</sup> Between 1921 and 1924, Jews arriving in Cuba in the hopes of entering the United States had been able to do so after a year’s waiting period. In 1924, however, the United States instituted immigration quotas, practically closing their gates to the thousands of Jewish immigrants waiting in Havana for the expiration of their term of residence.<sup>5</sup> These Jews were thus forced to remain on the tropical island.

Most of the Ashkenazi Jews arriving in Cuba were young emigrants from Eastern European countries, particularly Poland and Russia. The majority had been uprooted during World War I. While there is little data on the occupational distribution of the Jews before their immigration to Cuba, it can be surmised from various sources that most of them belonged to the petite bourgeoisie or to the urban proletariat. Several of the immigrants were semi-qualified workers, mainly tailors and shoe makers. None were professionals, and hardly any were students. In general, their educational level was low. Some could not even read or write Yiddish.<sup>6</sup>

This posed various problems, described in an article entitled “5,000 Jewish Refugees In Havana”, which appeared in the *JTA Bulletin* on December 9, 1924:

The new American immigration law has made it impossible for them to enter the Promised Land. These thousands of Jewish immigrants must remain in Cuba unless they go back to their former homes. What are they to work at to live? In the sugar fields, on the tobacco plantations, on the railroads? It is impossible for the East European Jew to endure that harrowing physical labor, and even if he could endure it, working in the open under the scorching sun and living in miserable shacks, he could not compete with the cheap labor brought into Cuba from other West Indian islands.<sup>7</sup>

The possibilities for employment as unskilled laborers in the sugar industry and related sectors were very limited, not only because of the inherent physical demands, but also because of the economic crisis and growing unemployment. Several Jews who tried their luck in building railroads found it more profitable to sell small commodities to their fellow workers, and thus began to trade.<sup>8</sup>

Cuban commerce was primarily controlled by Spaniards, the largest minority group. According to the 1931 census, they numbered 614,000 – almost 16 percent of the total population.<sup>9</sup> Commercial control of imported goods continued to be maintained by the veteran Spanish firms that had been in existence since the Colonial era. These firms grew substantially during the years of sugar prosperity (*las vacas gordas*) and opened branches in the interior regions.<sup>10</sup> Spaniards who immigrated to rural areas engaged mainly in non-agricultural occupations and were typically associated with the rural shops (*las tiendas mixtas rurales*) and with the grocery stores (*bodegas*). These immigrants lived inside their shops in modest conditions, working hard and diligently until they accumulated wealth. In general, they only employed their own people and thus supplied employment opportunities for immigrants from Spain.<sup>11</sup> Since Cuba imported most of its consumer commodities, the internal trade was based primarily on imported

merchandise intended particularly for the high and middle classes of the Cuban population. Members of other minorities, including the Chinese, Syrians and Jews, attempted to make a living by trading without capital. Unable to penetrate into Spanish firms, they were compelled to wander in towns or rural areas as peddlars selling cheap commodities on credit to the lower strata of the population.<sup>12</sup>

Since the consuming habits that characterized the period of prosperity could not be maintained after 1920, there was a growing demand for cheaper commodities among the Cuban population. The first Jewish immigrants, who for lack of any other skills made their living as tailors and shoemakers, thus encountered a tremendous demand for their products, which were much cheaper than imported merchandise sold in shops.<sup>13</sup>

A Sephardi Jew recalls giving a loan of ten dollars to a new Ashkanazi immigrant when he worked at HIAS: "The Ashkenazi bought 100 yards of material. His wife sewed 80 pairs of men's pants, and he sold them for 25 cents apiece. People went crazy. The whole world was buying. A week later his wife employed a girl to help her. A month later she employed five assistants. Three months later the Ashkanzi had already opened a factory."<sup>14</sup>

Jews were very active in the early stages of industrial development in Cuba, and were pioneers in certain branches of light industry such as the manufacture of knitwear, underwear and ties.<sup>15</sup> The establishment of small factories by Jews in Cuba coincided with the beginning of an economic diversification policy. The Tariff Law of 1927 issued by the government of Gerardo Machado increased the cost of products imported from the U.S. and protected local production.<sup>16</sup> Jews opened factories and warehouses for suits, shirts, underwear and leather goods, thus providing employment opportunities for Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. This led to the growth of a sector of Jewish manual laborers in Cuba.

In 1927, the director of the Jewish Committee for Cuba wrote in his report: "It is claimed that between 1500 and 2000 Jews are presently engaged in the manufacture of underwear, suits, overalls, neckties, shoes, leather goods and caps. Most of them are working in terrible sweat shops at low wages. This is a repetition of the conditions such as existed in New York 25 years ago."<sup>17</sup>

Many of these Jews arrived in Cuba at a time when there was enthusiastic support for the Russian Revolution. Their club – the Kultur Farain – was the most active Jewish organization in the 1920s, and ideological indoctrination was prevalent among the Jewish workers. Some of the leaders of the Kultur Farain were involved in the founding and activity of the Cuban Communist Party.<sup>18</sup>

During his second term of office (1928–33). President Gerardo Machado began to institute oppressive measures against his political opponents, particularly against the Communist Party.<sup>19</sup> At that time, foreign laborers, who played a major role in the consolidation of the labor movement and as members of the illegal Communist Party, were singled out for persecution: Five Jewish workers were assassinated by the secret police, over 60 were arrested, and many were deported to their native lands. In addition, the Kultur Farain was disbanded and its leaders were sent to prison.<sup>20</sup>

Persecution of communists harmed members of the Jewish population as well as left-leaning members of other minorities, such as the Spanish and the Chinese. Nevertheless, there was no general policy of discrimination against Jews as a foreign colony at that time. Such a policy was enforced later, during the revolution against the Machado dictatorship.<sup>21</sup>

#### **B. Cuban Labor Legislation and its Effects on Self-Employment Among Jews**

The 1933 Revolution, which transformed the political and social structure of Cuba, also affected the foreign-born population. Prior to 1933, hardly any labor legislation existed, and employers were free to dictate their terms.<sup>22</sup> The Law of Nationalization of Labor, enacted on November 8th, 1933 under Grau San Martín's revolutionary government (*La ley del cincuenta por ciento*), provided that at least 50 percent of the overall expenditure for wages go to native Cubans; all job vacancies or new positions were to be filled by native Cubans. The law was later amended to include naturalized Cubans as well.<sup>23</sup>

The Law of 50 Percent was a product of the revolutionaries' nationalistic ideology, whose slogan was "*Cuba para los Cubanos*", and of their hostility towards the Spanish workers caused by the prevalence of poverty and unemployment during the depression. Enforcement of the law was accompanied by incendiary propaganda and the rise of a movement demanding that 80 percent of the employers in every establishment be native Cubans. At the same time, violent riots ensued, aimed primarily at the Spaniards but also harming the Jewish population that lived in fear of persecution.<sup>24</sup> A large number of workers were dismissed from their jobs and forced to return to their countries of origin. Others were forced to change their legal status by obtaining Cuban citizenship or changing their occupation.

Grau's government lasted only a hundred days, but its fall did not change the policy of Nationalization of Labor. The Law of 50 Percent was enforced throughout the 1930s as Batista was gaining power and was incorporated in the Constitution of 1940. A report on the Cuban economy written 17 years

after the enactment of the law emphasizes its nationalistic character: "...the intent is not 50 percent, but actually a rapid approach to 100 percent native born personnel...some of the regulations of the labor law ordered under Decree no. 2977 illustrate the extent of this apparent preoccupation with the purification of a "Cuban race".<sup>25</sup>

Nationalization of labor did not limit the economic activities of foreigners as employers or owners of "home industries" in which they worked together with their spouses or children. The creation of home industries among the Jews was described in the Jewish periodical *Havaner Lebn* as proof of their adaptability to the changing economic circumstances, which made it possible for them to enter occupations abandoned by Spanish businessmen:

During the depression, instead of producing first class garments, there was a demand for cheap merchandise. A new field of the garment industry, vulgar tailoring, evolved as a result of the crisis. Clearly cheap labor is accompanied by cheap prices. The Jewish tailors thus entered a new professional field: they started to work in "slave factories", earning 50 cents, 40 cents and even less... When times became difficult, the high quality Cuban and Spanish tailors were alienated from their profession while the Jewish workers from Europe, who were familiar with American methods, knew how to succeed. Teams of three or four workers produced 12 to 14 jackets a day. Gradually, a new type of Jewish laborer emerged – the *Chalupnik*, who took work home from the Spanish Casas and employed two tailors to help him.<sup>26</sup>

The *Chalupnik* was a combination laborer and sub-contractor. Like several other categories of Jewish workers, the *Chalupniks* were gradually moving into the ranks of the self-employed, even though their economic level was not much higher than that of laborers. While there were more Jewish workers in the shoe factories than in the needle industry, the impact of the Jews on the production of shoes began to decline during the 1930s, probably due to competition with Cuban and Spanish shoe factories at a time when shoe production was increasing.

In the needle industry, however, development was rather slow until 1940 and garments were still largely imported. There was a large contingent of Jews in the local textile and garment industries, and many Jewish tailors, upon becoming self-employed, tended to hire Cuban seamstresses who worked at home.<sup>28</sup>

**Table No. 1**  
**Jewish Presence in Cuban Industries**

<b>Cuban selected industries*</b>		<b>Selected Jewish industries**</b>	
Total	3,105	Total	340
woven fabrics	7	woven fabrics	10
		fabrics and textiles	34
clothing for women and children	40	confeccion	35
clothing for men	174	shirts and underwear	20
shoes	466	suits, pants and ties	37
		shoes and leather goods	48

\* Extract from a list of industries registered with the Ministry of Agriculture, 1940<sup>29</sup>

\*\* Extract from an analysis Jewish industries advertised in Jewish periodicals (1930–1945)

### **C. Aspects of Deproletarianization characterizing the Jewish Minority**

Eastern European Jews had been attracted to jobs in factories, since this guaranteed familiar surroundings and saved them from having to cope with the Spanish language and Cuban environment. While Jewish proprietors generally preferred to employ Jews, employment in factories owned by Jews has never been exclusively Jewish.<sup>30</sup>

During the depression, immigration to Cuba came to a halt and resources for recruitment of new workers were depleted. Since many workers left Cuba or became self-employed, factories began to lose their Jewish character and the incentive to continue working in that environment because of its Jewish atmosphere declined.

It should be noted that for the Jews, Cuba has never been a Promised Land, but “an unpleasant way station from the hell of Europe to the heaven of America”.<sup>31</sup> The desire to reach the shores of the U.S. was a central motivating factor in the history of Cuban Jewry. Those who decided to stay in Cuba rather than continue to the U.S. were either successful or had no alternative. Among the successful Jews were the entrepreneurs who built the first factories that served as an economic basis for the Cuban Jewish community. Those who had no alternative were mostly laborers, for whom giving up the American dream was a traumatic experience. The disappointment in itself may have been an incentive for economic success, meant to counterbalance the “failure” of remaining in Cuba.

Jewish workers did not receive much encouragement from their Jewish employers to remain in the working class. The Law of 50 Percent discouraged employment of foreign labor and gave Jewish factory owners an incentive to hire more Cubans in order to avoid problems. Non-naturalized Jewish laborers found ways to circumvent the law, but their illegal status was a pressure tactic used by employers who knew that such employees could not be legally defended.<sup>32</sup>

It seems that the Jews believed they were meeting the expectations of Cuban society by creating new industries that would provide employment for Cuban workers. Here lies the leitmotif of Jewish apologetics of the 1930s. That is to say, Jews would portray their factories as a contribution to the industrial development of Cuba and take pride in the low percentage of foreign (i.e. Jewish) employees they hired.<sup>33</sup> Jewish workers were further disillusioned by the nationalistic attitude of the Cuban Labor movement following the revolution of 1933. Two weeks after the fall of Machado, that sentiment was expressed in the *Havaner Lebn*:

“It is unbelievable that the same leaders who marched so far with the revolutionaries and who themselves sought refuge from Machado’s rule in foreign lands would echo the word “foreign elements”. What is the meaning of foreigners? 200 shoemakers and tailors striking today? These are not foreigners. The Jewish workers suffered from the bloody rule of Machado exactly as the Cubans. They shed their blood like the labor leaders who were murdered.<sup>34</sup>

The process of leaving the working class was not always forced. Most Jewish workers already had the desire and ambition to move into the middle class. According to an old Jewish worker: “Cubans were not interested in building factories to break their backs. They wanted an easy life, to waste all their wages on Sunday – and on Monday nothing would be left. The Jew characteristically sought ways to leave the working class and become independent. I wasn’t like that. I remained a laborer.”<sup>35</sup>

Although Jewish workers were in conflict with their employers both ideologically and professionally, they used them as a model: “The Jew working as a laborer in a factory saw how his employer had succeeded and sought to become independent himself – so he opened his own shop.”<sup>36</sup> The person who made this statement, I. O. Schuchinsky, reflected in his own career the occupational mobility of several Jews in the shoe industry: he started as a laborer, and later became the owner of his own shoe factory. Then, after World War II, he became engaged in the import and wholesale marketing of leather.

The impact of the Communists on Jewish public life remained strong throughout the 1930s, and then began to diminish gradually. Upon

becoming self employed, Jews tended to leave the Jewish Communist Organization and move into the main organ of the Ashkenazi community, the Centro Israelita, which they had previously denounced as “reactionary and bourgeois”.

Given all of these developments, the number of Jewish workers decreased from approximately 1200 in 1933 to an estimated 200 to 300 by the end of World War II.<sup>37</sup> At the same time, the number of Jewish industrial and commercial firms gradually increased. An analysis of advertisements published in the Jewish press from 1933 to 1945 indicates that by 1936, 156 new firms were added to the 64 that had advertised in 1933, and 126 more were added by 1945.<sup>38</sup> 43.8 percent of the firms advertising engaged in production, 22.4 percent in retail trade and 17.6 percent in wholesale trade.

**Table No. 2**  
**Distribution of Jewish Firms**  
**According to Period of Advertisement**

Period	Industry	Wholesale Trade	Retail Trade	Other	No. of Firms
Up to 1933	37.5 %	14.1 %	26.6 %	21.9 %	64
1934–39	43.9 %	12.2 %	27.0 %	16.9 %	190
1940–45	45.5 %	21.2 %	20.1 %	13.2 %	189

Most Jewish commerce, however, was concentrated in the same fields of Jewish industry. The largest industry was ready-made clothing (*ropa hecha*), followed by leather goods.



**Table No. 3**  
**Distribution of Jewish Occupations**

(From an analysis of 340 advertisements published in the Jewish press, 1930–1945)

	Produc- tion	Wholesale Trade	Retail Trade	Services	Total %	Total Numbers
fabrics, woven						
fabrics & textile	4.7	5.9	2.4	0	12.9	44
clothing	22.9	0.6	4.1	0	27.6	94
shoes & leather	6.8	5.9	1.5	0	14.1	48
Jewelry, watches, diamonds & perfumes	3.5	3.2	6.2	0	12.9	44
foodstuff & restaurants	2.1	0.3	5.6	4.7	12.6	43
laundries, barbers, photographers & shippers	0	0	0	5.3	5.3	18
professions	0	0	0	5.9	5.9	20
miscellaneous	3.8	1.2	2.6	0.9	8.5	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>340</b>

**Conclusion**

Deproletarianization of Cuban Jewry was affected by factors similar to those affecting Jewish immigration to other countries in the Western Hemisphere: common social background, status as an ethno-religious minority and a high degree of adaptability. Hence, Jews tended to concentrate in occupations in which they had previous experience and then attempt to upgrade their economic and social status.

Deproletarianization might have been anticipated in view of the previous experience of the Jews in other countries. Undoubtedly, however, local factors contributed to the process. Of particular relevance were legal and social opposition towards employment of foreigners, accompanied by a high demand for development of local industry which encouraged entrepreneurial initiative. These forces, which simultaneously led to movement out of the working class and into the middle class, affected the Jews as well as other groups. For Cuban Jewry, the deproletarianization process

began as a legal transition from wage earners to self-employed businessmen – although there was no significant change in their economic or social situation. Only in the second stage, with the general improvement of the economic situation in Cuba during World War II, did Jews actually enter the middle class.

## NOTES

- \* The research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.
1. Nathan Reich, "The Economic Structure of Modern Jewry," in *The Jews* vol. II, Louis Finkelstein ed. (New York, 1949), pp. 1243–1247; Jacob Lestschinsky, "Jewish Economy," in *Klal Israel: Chapters of Jewish Sociology* (Jerusalem, 1954), pp. 219, 226 (Hebrew); Haim Avni, *Yahadut Argentina* (Jerusalem, 1972), pp. 17, 59. (Hebrew).
  2. According to Simon Kuznets, the economic life characteristic of a small minority, whose occupational structure differs from that of the general population, is subject to certain limitations. These derive in part from the nature and inclinations of the minority itself – the desire for cohesion, historical heritage; and in part from the attitude of the majority towards the immigrating minority and available economic opportunities. Simon Kuznets, *Economic Structure of U.S. Jewry: Recent Trends* (Jerusalem, 1972), pp. 16–17 (Hebrew).
  3. The distribution of immigrants according to nationality was: 63% Spaniards, 10% Jamaicans, 8% Haitians, 8% North Americans. *Census of the Republic of Cuba, 1919* (Havana), p. 182.
  4. Hugh Thomas, *Cuba the Pursuit of Freedom* (New York, 1972), pp. 540, 542; Ramiro Guerra, et. al., *Historia de la Nación Cubana* vol. IX (Havana, 1952), pp. 301–302, 349–353.
  5. Morris Lewis, "Jewish Social Work in Cuba", *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, 4:4 (June, 1928), pp. 317–327.
  6. Harry Viteles, *Report on the Status of the Jewish Immigration in Cuba, February 1925* (typewritten), p. 24; Boris Sapir, *The Jewish Community of Cuba* (New York, 1948), p. 25–27; B. Sapir, "The Jews in Cuba", *Yivo Bloter* 25 (January-June 1945), pp. 352–354 (Yiddish). Interviews: Moises Baldas – Tel Aviv, November 9, 1981; Osher Schuchinsky – Miami, June 6, 1984.
  7. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin* 5:282 (December 9, 1924), p. 5.
  8. Eduardo Weinfeld, "Los Judios en Cuba", *Revista Bimestre Cubana* 46 (1940), p. 468. Interviews: Israel Luski – Miami, May 28, 1984; Jacobo Mocasey – Miami, June 4, 1984.
  9. *Problems of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission of Cuban Affairs* (New York, 1935), p. 37. According to this source the number is exaggerated. According to the Spanish Chamber of Commerce there were 227,107 Spanish-born and 435,242 wives and children born in Cuba but probably holding Spanish citizenship. J.M. Alvarez Acevedo, *La Colonia Española en la Economía Cubana* (Havana, 1936), p. 39.
  10. Ramiro Guerra, et. al., *op. cit.*, pp. 336–337.
  11. *Problems of the New Cuba, op. cit.*, p. 351; Michael Kenny, "Twentieth Century Spanish Expatriates in Cuba: A Sub-Culture?", *Anthropological Quarterly* 34:2 (April, 1961), p. 90.
  12. Carolina Amram, *The Assimilation of Immigrants in Cuban Society During the 1920s and 1930s*, M.A. Thesis (Coral Gables, 1983), p. 60; Alvarez Acevedo, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–192.
  13. *Problems of the New Cuba, op. cit.*, p. 75; Boris Sapir, *The Jewish Community, (op. cit.)*, pp. 29–30.

14. Interview: Moise Bensignor – Miami, June 11, 1984.
15. Sender Kaplan, "Jews in the Cuban Economic Life", *Havener Lebn Almanaque* (Havana, 1943), pp. 13–19 (Yiddish); Leizer Ran, "Jews in Cuba", *Algemeine Ensiklopedie* 5 (New York, 1957), p. 426 (Yiddish).
16. José Alvarez Diaz et. al., *A Study on Cuba: The Cuban Economic Research Project*, University of Miami (Coral Gables, 1965), p. 358.
17. *Report of the Director of the Jewish Committee for Cuba* (Moris Lewis), (Havana, March 1927) (typewritten).
18. Boris Sapir, *The Jewish Community*, op. cit., p. 34; A. Eliezer, "The Jewish Worker and the Kultur Farain", *Oyfgang* (August-September 1934), pp. 20–21 (Yiddish); I.B. Mandelkern, "Five Cents", *Havener Lebn* (March 10, 1933) (Yiddish). Interviews: Zeev Rabinowitz – Ramot Menashe, May 9, 1983; Eliezer Aronowsky – Miami, June 5, 1984; Osher Schuchinsky – Miami, June 6&11, 1984.
19. Gerardo Machado y Morales, *Ocho Años de Lucha* (Miami, 1982), pp. 196–205.
20. Jorge Garcia Montes & Antonio Alonso Avila, *Historia del Partido Comunista de Cuba* (Miami, 1970), pp. 57–77; "Five Martyrs", *Dos Naie Kubaner Yiddish Vort* (May, 1963), pp. 19–22 (Yiddish). Interview: David Utiansky – Petah Tikva, April 2, 1981.
21. David Utiansky, "10,000 Jews Live Like in a Magic Cycle", *Idishe Djurnal* (February 18, 1934) (Yiddish); David Utiansky, "Jews Under Three Presidents in Cuba", *Der Tog* (November 11, 1934) (Yiddish).
22. Alvarez Diaz, op. cit., p. 385. Interviews: Zeev Rabinowitz op. cit., Aron Radlow – Miami, June 22, 1984.
23. Decree no. 2583 of November 8, 1933 regulated by decree no. 2977, December 6, 1933. Alvarez Diaz, op. cit., pp. 388–389.
24. Ruby Hart Phillips, *Cuba Island of Paradox* (New York, 1959), pp. 125–126; *Problems of the New Cuba*, op. cit., p. 34; *Centro Israelita de Cuba, Annual Report 1933–1934* HIAS-HICEM, I, XIII, 14 Yivo Archives.
25. *Report on Cuba, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), pp. 154–155.
26. *Havener Lebn* (September 22, 1933), p. 6. (*Chalupnik* – a form of putting in system).
27. Alvarez Diaz, op. cit., pp. 372–374.
28. Sender Volson, "Los Hebreos en la Vida Económica de Cuba", *Oyfgang* (August-September 1934), pp. 127–128; Leizer Ran, op. cit., p. 426.
29. Alvarez Diaz, op. cit., pp. 374–376.
30. Interviews: Zeev Rabinowitz – Tel Aviv, May 22, 1985; Aron Radlow. *Havener Lebn* [March 17, 1933].
31. Harry Viteles, op.cit., p. 10.
32. According to Zeev Rabinowitz it was easy to buy a Cuban birth certificate in the *pueblos* around Havana. See also: *Havener Lebn* (March 17, 1933), p. 19; *Kubaner Bleter* (December 1, 1938, pp. 23–24; *Kubaner Yiddish Vort* (October 4, 1942), p. 3.
33. Sender Volson, op. cit., Jaime Schuchinsky, "Los Hebreos en la Industria del Calzado", *Oyfgang* (August-September, 1934), pp. 118–119; David Curland, "El Español El Judío y La Revolución", *Acción* (October 21, 1934).
34. *Havener Lebn* (August 25, 1933), p. 14.
35. Interview: Zeev Rabinowitz – May 22, 1985.
36. Jaime Schuchinsky, op. cit., pp. 118–119.
37. Sapir, *Yivo Bleter*, op. cit., p. 355. *Havener Lebn* (February 23, 1934), p. 3.
38. It should be noted that 30 firms ceased advertising after 1933 and 127 after 1939.